INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR

 The Ceasefire Is Not a Deal to Be Celebrated—India Could Have Escalated to PoK

“He who hesitates is lost,” said Chanakya. India must remember—history does not favour the moralist. It favours the mover.

When India and Pakistan issued a joint statement in February 2021 to reaffirm their 2003 ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control (LoC), mainstream narratives hailed it as a diplomatic breakthrough. But under the surface of this seemingly prudent gesture lay a troubling possibility: India might have prematurely closed a window to reclaim its stolen geography — Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

This wasn’t just about shells and silence. It was about momentum, morality, and mandate. In a rare moment, all three were aligned. Yet, instead of seizing the initiative, India chose restraint. And history has taught us this: the cost of restraint is often paid not in peace but in regret.

The Strategic High Ground

In the years leading up to 2021, India found itself in an unprecedented position of strength. The Pulwama attack and the Balakot airstrikes that followed had galvanised national will. Cross-border strikes had proven feasible. The international community, largely fatigued by Pakistan’s terror duplicity, was less inclined to condemn Indian retaliation and more willing to listen.

The revocation of Article 370 in August 2019 had further shifted the narrative. For the first time, India was not merely defending its claim on Kashmir — it was reinforcing it through legislative assertion and administrative integration.

On the other hand, Pakistan was internally bleeding:

• An economic crisis loomed.
• Civil-military tensions were rising.
• Imran Khan’s government was losing credibility fast.
• China was quietly watching, but not eager to entangle further post-Galwan.

The strategic timing was ideal for a limited escalation into PoK — not to wage a reckless war, but to call the bluff of seven decades.

Instead, the ceasefire gave Pakistan a desperately needed breather, not just to regroup militarily, but to revive terror ecosystems, reassert diplomatic deniability, and shift focus to internationalizing Kashmir again through softer, passive-aggressive means.

The Ghosts of History

This isn't the first time India has erred on the side of restraint.

• In 1948, after Indian forces had managed to reclaim large parts of Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistani tribal invaders, Prime Minister Nehru took the dispute to the UN — freezing Indian troops mid-victory and gifting PoK to Pakistan in perpetuity.
• In 1965, India repelled a full-scale invasion and reached within striking distance of Lahore. Yet, the Tashkent Agreement saw India return all conquered territory for little in return.
• In 1999, India fought a limited war in Kargil. Despite the enemy’s blatant transgression and brutalization of Indian soldiers, Indian forces were barred from crossing the LoC to chase retreating intruders. Victory remained incomplete.

Each time, India chose the "moral high ground." But morality without results becomes an albatross, not a crown.

The 2021 ceasefire may be written as a diplomatic maturity. But maturity without assertion is simply paralysis in disguise.

The Legal and Moral Imperative

PoK is Not a Grey Zone

Let’s be clear — PoK is not a disputed territory. It is Indian territory under illegal occupation. The 1994 Indian Parliament resolution leaves no ambiguity: PoK is an integral part of India.

Then why has India made peace with silence? Why does the nation that once dreamed of flying the tricolour in Gilgit now use diplomacy as a blanket for inaction?

The people of PoK have suffered for decades. Basic rights are denied. Gilgit-Baltistan’s resources are plundered. Political repression is routine. Pakistani military establishment uses the region as a launching pad for terror — both ideologically and physically.

By choosing to "hold the fire," India also chose, implicitly, to let this suffering continue.

If India's legitimacy over PoK is unquestionable, then its silence is a betrayal — of its Constitution, of its history, and of the people of PoK themselves.

Escalation Isn’t Recklessness—It’s Resolution

To be clear, this is not an argument for blind war. Escalation does not mean a full-scale invasion.

Rather, it’s about leveraging momentum:

• A show of force to seize limited tactical ground in PoK.
• A covert-ops framework to dismantle terror camps surgically.
• An information campaign to expose Pakistan's colonial grip over Gilgit-Baltistan.

Had India done so post-2019, global conditions may have been supportive, or at least neutral. Today, the narrative is slipping again — and time favours the one who moves, not the one who hesitates.

Pakistan uses every ceasefire to rebuild, re-strategies, and relaunch. India uses it to celebrate restraint and hope morality will win the day. It won't.

Peace With Honour, Not Peace With Hesitation

India must understand that peace without resolution is simply delay. The ceasefire of 2021 may have brought temporary calm, but it cost India something far greater — the opportunity to correct a historical wrong.

In Mahabharata, Krishna did not preach peace at all costs. When negotiations failed, he urged Arjuna to fight — not for bloodlust, but for dharma.

Today, India's dharma lies in reclaiming what is rightfully hers — not just to redraw borders, but to reassert the very idea of India as a sovereign, assertive civilisation that no longer accepts partition, terror, or cowardice as fate.

"Time Favours the bold. History rewards the resolute. Ceasefire may have been a pause—but the next chapter must begin with purpose."

 

ISLAMIC JIHAD IN INDIA

From Kerala to Bengal: The Expanding Web of Islamist Radicalization in India and the Role of Global Islamic Jihadist Networks

Introduction

Kerala, once celebrated for its secularism and social harmony, is now facing a severe national security threat due to rising Islamist radicalization. Once marked by literacy and communal peace, the state has become a significant hub for extremist activity in India, with links extending to Pakistan’s ISI and terror financing networks in West Asia, Gulf countries, and Bangladesh. This report examines the rise of radical Islamic organisations in Kerala, especially the Popular Front of India (PFI), their role in spreading extremist ideologies, and the growing influence of such networks in other states like West Bengal.

The Popular Front of India (PFI): Origins and Ideological Foundations

Throughout the 1990s, the violent political tactics of mainstream Left parties, particularly in the districts of Kannur, Malappuram, and Kasaragod, as well as their surrounding areas, sparked religious polarization in Kerala. The frequent violence perpetrated by the political workers of the Left party (LDF Front) led to the rise of extremist right Islamic organizations. The Naddapuram Defense Forum, commonly known as the National Defense Force (NDF), emerged as a local Muslim rights party and quickly gained significant support among Muslim communities that had suffered the brunt of the violence in Kerala. NDF managed to establish a substantial presence by recruiting from a large pool of vulnerable Muslim youth. The ensuing political climate facilitated the activities of Islamic political organizations, further exacerbating the radical and extremist agenda.

Kerala’s transformation into a hotspot for radical Islamist activity is neither sudden nor isolated. Over the years, Islamist organisations, ranging from Jamaat-e-Islami to the banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), to NDF, and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) led by Islamic cleric Abdul Nazer Mahdani, along with other smaller parties, have proliferated and created an ideological ecosystem that laid the foundation for groups like the Popular Front of India (PFI) to thrive.

The now-banned PFI, formed in 2006 through the merger of three radical organisations- the National Development Front (NDF) in Kerala, Manitha Neethi Pasarai (MNP) in Tamil Nadu, and the Karnataka Forum for Dignity (KFD)- is perhaps the most influential and dangerous Islamist organisation that operated in South India. Its stated objective is to resist the rise of Hindu nationalist politics in India, but beneath this veneer lies a deeper agenda of Islamisation and ideological warfare. The National Investigative Agency (NIA), in one of its charge sheets filed in 2022, has mentioned that PFI aimed to establish Shariah-based Islamic rule in India by the year 2047 through various subversive means, including political subversion.

PFI’s roots are closely linked to SIMI, a proscribed terrorist organisation that birthed another proscribed terrorist organisation, the Indian Mujahideen (IM). Many of PFI’s founding members were SIMI operatives, including EM Abdul Rahiman (former SIMI general secretary), E Aboobacker (SIMI’s Kerala chief), and P Koya, who was instrumental in building both SIMI and NDF. These individuals carried forward SIMI’s legacy of militant Islamism under a new brand.

The PFI’s hierarchical and cell-based structure allows decentralised decision-making while maintaining ideological cohesion. Through its affiliates, including the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), Campus Front of India (CFI), National Women’s Front (NWF), and NGOs like Rehab India Foundation, it has established a grassroots presence across 22 Indian states. PFI cadres are known to mobilise in slums, urban centres, educational institutions, and mosques, promoting their agenda under the guise of legal aid, charity, and social work. This effort has created a comprehensive socio-political network that can penetrate all layers of Muslim society. On the surface, these units advocate for civil rights, legal aid, and educational equity, but deeper investigations revealed that this was merely a façade to conceal more radical agendas.

Radicalization and Recruitment:

The PFI and its political wing, the SDPI, employ a sophisticated strategy to radicalise disenfranchised Muslim youth. Drawing on Salafi-Wahhabi ideology, they utilise religious and political narratives to spread extremist views across slums, campuses, urban centres, and rural districts. Though inspired by Salafi beliefs, the PFI recruits from diverse Islamic sects, uniting them under the vision of an Islamic Caliphate governed by Sharia.

PFI runs parallel ideological movements in colleges and rural societies, promoting anti-democratic narratives by equating constitutional democracy with kufr (apostasy). A former ISIS recruit from Kerala revealed continued allegiance to ISIS ideology despite de-radicalisation programs, citing indoctrination through encrypted platforms by Gulf-based Salafi clerics.

The remote village of Attakad in Kerala showcases the deep roots of Salafi radicalism. Influenced by Yemeni ideology similar to that of the Houthis and ISIS, it attracted a Sri Lankan cleric linked to the 2019 Easter bombings, who recruited locals for ISIS. Although many families fled, extremist beliefs persist.

PFI’s links to global jihadist movements are well documented. Members have been arrested for ISIS recruitment and terror training camps, with ties to ISKP, AQIS, and incidents like the Bengaluru café blast.

Key Radicalization Channels

1. a) Digital and Religious Literature: Radical content circulates widely, both online and offline, primarily through social media platforms like Facebook. Gulf-based pages promote Salafi ideology, particularly regarding Sharia compliance in business and society. Institutions that advance Sharia research further reinforce exclusivist thinking.

2. b) Travel to Conflict Zones: Dozens from Kerala have joined ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, often referred to locally as Mujahids, indicating tacit approval within segments of the community.

3. c) Unregulated Madrassas: Many Salafi-oriented madrassas recruit impoverished youth from across India. These institutions promote narrow interpretations of Islam and are linked to Tablighi and Dawah movements, particularly in sensitive states like Assam and J&K.

4. d) Goal of Islamic State: PFI and its affiliates aim to establish an Islamic state. They receive funding from Gulf sources through hawala and gold smuggling, targeting Dalits, Christians, and disillusioned youth for religious conversion. Satyasarini, PFI’s educational arm, plays a central role in these efforts, claiming over 3,000 conversions. It preaches strict Salafism and sends recruits abroad for further radical training, with some joining ISIS. Their women’s wing actively conducts college campaigns and provides legal and financial support for converts.

5. e) Diaspora Influence: Kerala’s significant Gulf diaspora frequently brings back radical ideologies, intensifying sectarian divides and supporting recruitment efforts.

6. f) Campus Radicalisation: SDPI’s student wing has influenced students in professional colleges, leading some to leave due to perceived Sharia violations in co-ed education. The extent of this issue remains unclear due to underreporting.

7. g) Islamic Education Networks: Figures like M.M. Akbar (dubbed the “Zakir Naik of Kerala”) run schools that promote Salafi exclusivity. His Peace International Schools have been flagged for communal teachings. Akbar maintains connections with Gulf-based extremists and the Muslim Brotherhood.

International Ties and Gulf Networks

One of the most insidious aspects of PFI’s operations is its connection to international jihadist networks through the Gulf. Handlers based in Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey play a crucial role in the radicalisation process. The organisation has developed strong ties with international Islamist groups, notably those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and organisations in Turkey and Qatar. Some PFI leaders have maintained connections with clerics associated with Jabhat al-Nusra, now commonly known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. The now-deceased Aijaz Ahangar, former chief of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), was responsible for recruiting approximately a hundred Malayali Muslims into the global Islamic State (ISIS) network through his networks operating out of Qatar and Turkey. This trend of recruitment continues, with ISKP now maintaining a separate Malayalam wing for propaganda and recruitment based in Qatar.

These handlers, often affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood or other extremist Islamist organisations, preach extremism via encrypted communication and disseminate religious discourses through social media. As mentioned by another former ISIS recruit from Kerala, who during his interrogation confessed that his radicalisation was facilitated online by a Qatar-based handler, he was introduced to purist Salafi Islam and radical interpretations of jihad and Shariah.

According to him, the ideology promoted in these interactions emphasises that democracy is “Kufr” (disbelief) and that Muslims must reject secular democratic governance methods in favour of establishing an Islamic state. This ideology deeply resonates with the PFI’s narrative and enables radicalization at a deep and persistent level.

Political Penetration and Societal Impact

Though PFI was banned in 2022, its political wing, SDPI, continues to operate freely and spread radicalism. Many former PFI cadres have shifted to SDPI, thus maintaining their ideological mission under a political banner. While overt activities have slowed, their grassroots penetration remains strong. According to some analysts, SDPI utilises democratic platforms not for mainstream political purposes but to spread radical ideologies and assert a Pan-Islamic identity.

SDPI/PFI’s social impact of its preaching has led to glaring visible changes in Kerala. The construction of mosques in Arabian architecture, adopting the Arabic language, and using Arabic as signage on shops and other establishments in Muslim-dominated areas reflect a profound cultural transformation, referred to by many as the “Arabisation” of Kerala’s Muslim community. This shift is driven by massive Gulf remittances, which fund lifestyles, religious institutions, education, and political mobilisation.

The widespread adoption of Arabic customs and dress codes among youth has culturally alienated Keralite Muslims from Indian traditions. This growing obsession with Arab culture is one of the key enablers of radical Islamist narratives, making it easier for organisations like PFI/SDPI to claim authenticity and divine authority in their calls for Sharia and Islamic governance. While Kerala’s traditional Muslim ethos was rooted in Indian pluralism, the rising influence of Arabic/Gulf-influenced Islamist culture has created a societal rupture.

Role of Other Organizations and Resistance from Within

Kerala’s mainstream Muslim organizations have largely distanced themselves from the PFI. The Muslim Coordination Committee, led by the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), has excluded PFI/SDPI from its fold. However, they are now being compelled to adopt the same extremist political rhetoric for political relevance. The IUML and other Sunni factions have opposed PFI’s ideological extremism and rejected its political vision. However, other Islamic political organizations have been less vocal, partly due to shared ideological spaces with PFI or their reluctance to alienate their voter base. Conversely, institutions like the Muslim Educational Society (MES) and JDT Islam represent a promising counterbalance. These secular Muslim organizations promote modern education and pluralistic values, providing an alternative to madrassas and Islamic seminaries.

The ISI Connection: Pakistan’s Covert War

Pakistan’s ISI has played a pivotal role in promoting radicalization in India, using Bangladesh and Middle Eastern/ Gulf countries as proxies. The ISI maintains strong ties with Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT), and ABT. Through these organisations, it seeks to exploit India’s communal fault lines and destabilise internal security.

In Kerala, ISI’s influence is channelled through Gulf-based networks. Radical clerics funded by Pakistan-backed NGOs preach Salafist doctrine and provide logistical support to Islamist cells in India. In West Bengal, the ISI operates via Bangladesh, using JMB and ABT as conduits. These groups are involved in counterfeit currency rackets, human trafficking, and arms/narcotics smuggling, all under the ISI’s strategic umbrella.

The ISI’s relationship with global jihadist organizations is symbiotic. For example:

• Al-Qaeda: Pakistan has sheltered Al-Qaeda leaders for years; AQIS now directly targets India.

• ISIS: ISI-supported handlers in the Gulf facilitate recruitment from Kerala and Kashmir.

• HuT: Hizb ut-Tahrir is used as a radicalisation tool in educational campuses and mosques/madrassas.

• ABT operates under ISI’s patronage from Bangladesh and is responsible for cross-border infiltration into Assam, Tripura, Jharkhand, Bihar, and West Bengal.